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Introduction

*
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) is endowed with abundant fresh water: In 2014, it accounted for 32 percent of the world's internal renewable water resources (FAO 2016) . Historically, however, access to improved water and sanitation services in the region was unequal, service quality was poor, and financing of the sector was inadequate.
To deal with such issues, starting in the early 1990s, countries adopted major reforms of their water and sanitation sectors. By the end of the decade, almost every country in the region had undertaken such sector reforms (Foster 2005) . The objectives of these reforms were to extend access to water and sanitation services to 100 percent of the population and improve the efficiency and financial viability of the sector.
To achieve these objectives, most LAC countries introduced legislation focused on financing and governance. Efforts were made to attract private participation to the sector, in order to fill the financing gap. Initial aggressive efforts in some countries led to very high levels of private participation by the end of the 1990s (86 percent of total financing of the sector in Chile and 62 percent in Argentina). By the mid-2000s, however, private participation had returned to its earlier (low) levels (Foster 2005 ).
Many countries also created autonomous regulatory bodies to supervise the activities of the private sector, in order to ensure that quality standards were met in a cost-effective manner. These reforms went farther than the private sector participation reforms: By the end of the 1990s, more than half of the countries in the region had created a regulatory body in the sector (see appendix table A.1 for a list of the regulators in each country). Incongruences between the level of government at which the sector was regulated (centrally) and managed (more locally) limited the positive impact of such reforms, however.
Thus, following the reforms that started during the early 1990s throughout LAC countries, progress in access to water and sanitation services was made, but there is evidence that such progress has been significantly constrained by affordability and governance issues. This chapter describes the key characteristics of the sector in LAC. The next section looks at sector performance (access to water and sanitation and tariffs in the water sector). The following sections describe governance (regulation and the role of private participation), briefly review the empirical literature, and summarize the chapter's main findings.
Sector Performance
Access to Improved Water Sources
Access to improved drinking water sources has increased since the beginning of the reform waves that started in the early 1990s. For the region as a whole, access increased from 81 percent of the population in 1990 to 95 percent in 2015 (figure 1). All but two countries (the Dominican Republic and Haiti) increased access during this period. Belize, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay, which had very low access rates in 1990, increased access to more than 95 percent. * We are grateful to Antonio Estache for comments and suggestions. Any mistake or misinterpretation is our responsibility and ours only and should not be attributed to any of the institutions we are affiliated with. Progress in LAC was remarkable by world standards. So great was the improvement that in 2015, the only set of countries that had a higher access rate than LAC were developed countries, where 99 percent of the population had access to improved drinking water (figure 2). Improvement was fueled by increases in urban access. Rural access remains low: The region performs better than Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia and better than the average for developing countries (84 percent versus 83 percent), but it lags well behind developed countries, where 98 percent of the rural population has access (figure 2). In some countries, such as Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, rural rates are close to urban ones. In others, such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela, rural access rates are below 80 percent, considerably below urban rates (figure 3). Efforts to improve access have focused on urban areas, possibly because of their high growth rates in terms of population and increasing demand for water services.
1
Access to Improved Sanitation Services
Access to sanitation improved in LAC between 1990 and 2015, but the average figure reached just 81 percent (figure 4). Some countries made good progress: Between 1990 and 2015, access increased from 28 percent to 50 percent in Bolivia, from 48 percent to 83 in Honduras, and from 57 percent to 85 percent in Ecuador. However, and though important improvements, some countries were in 2015 at worryingly low levels, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti or Nicaragua.
1 LAC is the most urbanized region in the world, having increased its urbanization rate from 73 percent in 1995 to 80 percent in 2014 (Arroyo, Ballestero, and Mejía 2015) . Access to improved sanitation services exceeded 90 percent in urban areas of most countries in the region in 2015 (figure 5). It was much lower in rural areas: In some countries (Guatemala, Bolivia, and Haiti), less than half the rural population had access to improved sanitation. 
Water Tariffs
Water tariffs play a key role in improving the efficiency of water use. On the demand size, they determine the price water users pay for water, thus having social equity consequences. On the supply side, they determine the extent to which water utilities can recover costs, thus having financial sustainability consequences.
Increasing block tariffs (IBTs) have traditionally been the choice of water regulators and policymakers in developing countries, because they supposedly protect the poor. In such an IBT setup, consumption is structured in blocks, with the first block corresponding to the lowest level of consumption and the last block corresponding to the highest level of consumption. Water users are charged a fixed unit price for the units consumed in the first block, a higher price for units consumed in the second block, and so on. In terms of policy, three decisions must be taken when setting up an IBT structure: (i) the number of blocks, (ii) the volume of water associated with each block, and (iii) the unit price of water associated to each block.
Increasing block tariffs were long thought to be efficient, pro-poor, thus attending to equity concerns, and environmentally advantageous for the following reasons:
 Wealthier households and industrial firms cross-subsidize poor households, promoting equity.
 Higher prices associated with higher blocks of consumption discourage irresponsible water use, supporting environmental objectives.
 Block charges are consistent with marginal cost pricing, which promotes economic efficiency.
But doubts have been raised about their effectiveness in developing countries. Boland and Whittington (1998) conclude that they increase inefficiency, inequity, complexity, opacity, and instability and create forecasting difficulties. They claim that simpler structures-such as two-part tariffs, which charge a fixed price per month plus a variable amount based on the volume consumed-can achieve better results.
Increasing block tariffs are the most common water tariff structure in LAC. Capitals 2 in all countries except Chile, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, which have two-part water tariffs, and Haiti, which has a simple linear tariff, use increasing block tariffs (figure 6).
3 However, the design of IBT structures vary significantly across countries in terms of level of fixed and variable charges, and number and width of blocks.
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For some countries, due to unavailability of data on its capital cities, the analysis has been done on the most important city, in economic and population terms. The Bahamas has not been included in the figures due to their considerably higher tariffs with respect to the rest of the region, creating graphical distortions. These differences in the level of fixed and variable charges, the number and width of blocks imply that monthly water bills vary widely across countries (figure 7). For low levels of monthly consumption (3 cubic meters), the difference between the lowest (Honduras) and highest (the Bahamas and Uruguay) bill is about $12. At the highest level of consumption (50 cubic meters), this difference grows to $230. Excluding the outlier in the sample (the Bahamas), significant differences in water bills start appearing at consumption levels of 15 cubic meters. The average bill for consumption of 15 cubic meters a month, considered to be the minimum amount of water required at the household level to satisfy basic needs, is $8.50 in LAC (see appendix figure A.1), 4 slightly less than in other developing regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa ($9.90) or the Middle East and North Africa ($10.40). LAC households less, on average, than these two developing regions' households for the minimum level of consumption to cover for basic needs. But prices vary widely across countries. In most countries in LAC, the unit price is slightly higher for higher levels of consumption, pointing towards a tariff structure penalizing high levels of consumption. 4 At 15 cubic meters of consumption, the lowest bill is in Honduras ($1.12) and the highest is in the Bahamas ($53.87). Another indicator that reveals the heterogeneity in water prices in LAC is the average price per cubic meter (figure 8). In most LAC capitals, the average price per cubic meter increases as a function of the consumption level, albeit not steeply. Some countries charge the same rate per cubic meter, regardless of the level of consumption. No country in LAC charges less per cubic meter for higher levels of consumption. In some countries outside the region, such as Spain, the average price of water falls as consumption rises. 
Unreliable Access to Water
Urban access to water increased markedly after 1990, but the share of the population with continuous access actually declined slightly between 2008 and 2012, according to survey of selected cities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, falling from 87.9 percent to 86.5 percent (CAF, 2014) . Moreover, among the share of the population that does not have a continuous access to water services (13.5 percent in 2012), there was a significant increase between 2008 and 2012 in the share of users who had access less than once every 15 days, from 38.0 percent to 44.4 percent (figure 9). On the positive side, among people who lacked continuous water service, there was an increase in the share of people with access a few hours every day (from 44.6 percent to 56.3 percent) and a significant decrease in the share of users with access only every two or three days (from 14.0 percent to 7.4 percent). 
Health Consequences of Unsafe Water and Sanitation
Limited and unreliable access has negative effects on public health. The mortality rate attributed to unsafe water and sanitation is much lower in LAC (3.15 per 100,000 people) than in other developing regions (table 1) . It is significantly higher than in developed regions, such as Europe (0.65 per 100,000 people) and North America (0.6 per 100,000 people), however. (See appendix figure A.2 for national mortality rates in LAC.) Another measure of the burden imposed by inadequate water and sanitation services is disability adjusted life years (DALYs). 6 In 2012 LAC countries collectively lost 980,000 DALYs. The highest absolute figures were in Haiti, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Colombia (figure 10). On a population-adjusted basis, the heaviest burdens were in Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras. 6 One DALY can be thought of as representing one lost year of healthy life. The sum of DALYs across the population can be thought of as a measure of the gap between the current health status and an ideal health situation, in which the entire population survives to old age, free of disease and disability. The share of unaccounted water is also high in LAC. In 2012, 39 percent of total water supply was unaccounted for (it leaked or did not make it to its destination for some other reason) (figure 11). In Costa Rica, Panama, or Uruguay, the figure exceeded 50 percent.
Untreated wastewater is pumped into rivers and oceans, with severe consequences for both the environment and health. Even in urban areas, on average only 54 percent of wastewater was collected between 2008 and 2012 (the figure ranged from 10 percent in the Dominican Republic to 96 percent in Chile) ( figure 12) . Worse yet, only 26 percent of urban wastewater was treated (the figure ranged from 
Sector Financing and Governance
Performance of the water and sanitation sector is closely related to its financing and governance. This section examines the evolution of public and private financing of the sector over the past decade, the financial performance of sector operators, and the characteristics of the sector's governance on a country-by-country basis.
Investment in Water and Sanitation
LAC needs to spend 0.30 percent of GDP a year until 2030 to meet the water and sanitation needs in order to maintain actual access rates in urban areas and improve access rates in rural areas by closing on the coverage and quality gaps (Arroyo, Ballestero, and Mejía 2015) . Average annual investment in the water and sanitation sector over this period range from 0.19 to 0.38 percent of GDP, with an average of 0.28 percent of GDP ( figure 13 ). Almost all of this spending was public.
Moreover, new infrastructure put in place to close on the coverage and quality gaps, directly imply additional maintenance and operating costs. Thus, the necessary spending in water and sanitation should be above 0.30 percent of GDP, and an effort is then needed to increase the sector's financing, whether the source is public or private, with respect to recent years in LAC. The relationship between spending and access is not clear. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama spent considerably less than average and had below-average access rates for both water and sanitation and suboptimal service quality. But other countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Paraguay, spent significantly less than the sample average and had high rates of access to both water and sanitation, and in yet others (including Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Peru), access to water and sanitation was considerably weak, but spending was well above average, which could indicate that the necessary steps are being taken to close on the coverage and quality gaps. The private sector has an important role to play in LAC, particularly given the constraints on government budgets. After declining considerably between 2000 and 2011, it increased in 2012-2015 (figure 15), making LAC the leading region in the world for private participation in the sector ( figure  16 ). More than three-quarters of commitments were concentrated in a few countries, however (including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). Efforts are thus needed in the region to increase private participation throughout the region, not only to reach the necessary investment levels in the sector, but also to release pressure on government spending. The nature of private sector involvement in the sector has change since 1990. During the 1990s, 42 percent of projects were brownfield, 21 percent were greenfield, 21 percent were divestitures, and 16 percent were management and lease contracts (figure 17) (See Box 1 for a description of these types of contracts). From the early 2000s until the beginning of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, brownfield projects accounted for 73 percent of all commitments. In 2009-16, 68 percent of projects were brownfield projects, 28 percent were greenfield, and 4 percent were management and lease contracts. The private sector thus appears to be increasingly attracted to contract types entailing new investments and increased power of decision. Divestitures and management and lease contracts seem to have lost their appeal, as they do not imply new investments and have a higher dependence to the public sector.
Box 1: Summary of characterization of contract types (The World Bank PPI Database)
1. Management and lease contracts: Take-over of the management of a public asset by a private firm for a fixed duration (the ownership and investment decisions remain with public sector).
Greenfield projects:
Construction and operation of a new facility by a private operator or a partnership between private and public actors for a duration specified in the project contract.
3. Brownfield projects: Take-over of the operations, improvement, expansion and/or rehabilitation of an existing asset by a private firm or a public-private partnership.
Divestitures:
Full or partial transfer of ownership of a public asset to a private firm through a direct sale or a public offering. Throughout the last decade, financing in the sector has not reached the necessary levels to fill in the coverage and quality gaps, and efforts should be made in that sense during the next 15 years; in that sense, not only the public sector should increase the spending in water and sanitation, but efforts should be made to increase attractiveness of the sector to private participation, as current spending does not totally cover necessary financing in terms of new infrastructure, but consequently neither in terms of new maintenance and operation costs.
Financial Performance of Water Operators
Insufficient financial resources prevent operators from expanding the network and increasing the coverage rate and quality of service, thus having negative consequences in terms of efficiency and equity. Excessive dependence on the government creates financing uncertainty and opens the door to political interference and clientelism (Ducci and García Merino 2013) .
Two financial measures-the operating cost coverage ratio and the leverage rate-reveal the financial performance of water operators. The operating cost coverage ratio is the ratio of operating revenue over operating costs (excluding depreciation). The leverage rate (total liabilities over net worth) is an indicator of indebtedness.
Information on these indicators is scarce in LAC. The very limited data available suggest that very few countries have water utilities with adequate operating cost coverage ratios.
An operating cost coverage ratio of 1.30 allows a private operator to cover depreciation costs, taxes, and net financial results. A ratio above 1.30 allows it to invest in new infrastructure to improve coverage, or better quality). A ratio below 1.30 implies the need to find external financing sources, generally government funding (Ducci and García Merino 2013) .
Operating cost coverage ratios vary widely across countries (figure 18).
7 Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica have operating cost coverage ratios that are well above 1.30. Argentina and Panama do not 7 There appears to be little variability within countries, although the sample is small (see table A.2). cover their operating costs with their operating revenues. On average, operating revenues cover operating costs, but the average ratio (1.17) is below the recommended level of 1.30.
Ducci and García Merino (2013) recommend that leverage not exceed 100 percent of net worth. The sample average leverage rate is 57 percent (see figure 18 ). Some countries have much higher averages, however. Brazil and Chile exceed 100 percent, but these high ratios reflect the easier access to financial markets that these countries' operators have. Other countries are well below the sample average, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay or Panama. These low leverage rates show a significant room for maneuver in terms of accessing financial markets, but to do so, they should complement this room with enough attractiveness to investors The financial performance of LAC capital cities' water operators shows a significant variability between the region's countries. On the one hand, some countries show operating cost coverage ratios considerably high, implying a higher financial capability that will allow them, not only to cover their operating and financial costs, but also to invest to improve the service quality and coverage. Other countries find themselves in the opposite situation, not being able to cover their operating costs. Likewise, these countries appear to have considerably low leverage rates, which could indicate that their dependence on government financing is rather high, as they are not appealing enough to financial markets. Indeed, if operating revenues do not manage to cover operating costs, consequently, returns on investment should be relatively low, thus unattractive to potential investors.
Regulation of the Water and Sanitation Sector
To improve the governance of the water and sanitation sector and enhance its attractiveness to the private sector, many countries in LAC decentralized the provision of water and sanitation services in the 1990s and created independent regulatory agencies.
8 By the mid-2000s, however, service provision 8
The term independence does not imply complete independence from the political power but rather that financial, administrative, and operating autonomy limits political interference. was decentralized but regulation was carried out at the central level. This model created conflicts that endangered the well-functioning of the sector and limited the positive effects of reforms. It also made the sector unattractive to the private sector (Foster 2005) .
Today, about 75 percent of LAC countries have independent agencies regulating their water sectors, and about 70 percent have private participation in the water and sanitation sector (table 2) . About a quarter of countries with independent regulatory agencies do not have private sector participation, and about 20 percent of countries with private participation do not have regulatory agencies.
Very few LAC countries have subnational independent regulatory agencies which, without having analyzed the decentralization level of water management (see below) would imply that no solution has been brought to the central regulation versus decentralized water management conflict described by Foster in 2005. It is thus worth analyzing whether centralization or decentralization levels of the water and sanitation sector regulation and its management coincide, or as was the case more than a decade ago, diverge, creating conflicts and affecting negatively the well-functioning of the sector. Table 2 Presence of independent regulatory agency and private participation in water and sanitation sector, 2017 Table 3 Level of government handling regulation and management of the water sector in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with independent regulatory agencies, 2017
Incongruences thus remain between the level of decentralization of sector regulation and management. They could be one factor behind the limited quality of service, the poor financial performance of water utilities, and the very low coverage rates in rural areas.
Brief Review of the Empirical Literature
Recent studies of LAC have confirmed the positive effects of higher-quality infrastructure on the economy and living standards documented in Aschauer's seminal 1989 paper. Lanau (2017) , for instance, shows that better infrastructure raises growth and investment and that improved infrastructure could yield substantial economic benefits in the region.
Empirical studies focus on four areas:
 performance indicators  the effects of privatization on sector performance  governance and policy aspects of the sector  tariff schemes and their linkages to performance indicators and governance characteristics.
Performance Indicators
Performance of the water and sanitation sector is traditionally studied through its effects on the economy, public health and the environment. In their 2017 report, Fay et al. describe that water access has improved significantly over the last years but that sanitation coverage is an increasingly urgent challenge; likewise, inefficient public spending is one of the causes behind the challenges in the sector. Gamper-Rabindran, Khan, and Timmins (2010) find strong positive correlations between the introduction of piped water and reductions in the infant mortality rate in Brazil. Schady (2015) reviews the literature and finds that the stronger evidence on the relationship between access to water and sanitation infrastructure and child outcomes in LAC is for extensions of coverage and is limited to child mortality; it does not cover other health aspects, such as morbidity, nutritional status, or development. Grafton et al. (2011) analyze a 10-country household survey. They find that concerns about the environment have a significant effect on some self-reported water-saving behaviors. Molinos-Senante and Donoso (2016) propose a water rate for Chile that creates incentives to improve water use sustainability.
Effects of Privatization
In their study of Brazil, Barbosa, De Lima, and Brusca (2016) argue that privatization is a consistent manner of ensuring accessibility to water services, as the private sector provides with the financing that the public sector does not have the capacity to cover. Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten (2009) find that following the introduction of private sector participation in Latin America, the share of households connected to piped water and sewerage rose significantly and the introduction of the private sector did not have any negative effects on the poor. Galliani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) show that child mortality in Argentina fell by about 8 percent in areas that introduced the private sector in their water services; the reduction was largest in the poorest areas. In their study of all infrastructure sectors in in nine Latin American countries, Sirtaine et al. (2005) find that the financial returns of private investment were modest and that returns to many concessions were below the cost of capital. Andrés, Schwartz, and Guasch (2013) find that the performance of water utilities in LAC is not highly correlated with the type of ownership (public or private). Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) show that, for developing countries and infrastructure in general, the effect of switching from centralization to decentralization depends on the financing mechanism of local governments. Herrera and Post (2014) find that decentralization does not necessarily stop political interference in the water and sanitation sector. Barde (2017) concludes that access rates in Brazil increased considerably between 2000 and 2010 in areas in which local governments were responsible for service. Barbosa, De Lima, and Brusca (2016) show that utilities operate best at the metropolitan level.
Effects of Governance
Bertoméu-Sánchez, Camós, and Estache (2017) find that globally, though having an independent regulatory agency has positive effects on the functioning of the sector, such an agency is not a necessary or sufficient condition for attracting private sector participation, although in LAC having an independent regulatory agency increases the odds of attracting private financing to the sector. Estache, Gómez-Lobo and Leipziger (2001) for Latin America, and Andrés, Schwartz, and Guasch (2013) conclude that although private participation has been crucial in increasing sector performance, it must be accompanied by transparent and accountable regulation, which significantly improves performance, and makes the poor better off as a result. Ferro, Romero, and Covelli (2011) highlight that regulation can have positive effects on efficiency as long as information is available, quality standards are well specified, and other conditions are met. Zetland and Gasson (2013) show that globally, higher water tariffs are correlated with lower per capita consumption, lower water availability, higher demand, and lower risk of shortage; at the national level, higher tariffs are also correlated with higher GDP and better governance. Jiménez, Serebrisky, and Mercado (2016) show that in Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, regardless of the price they pay, consumers' satisfaction and willingness to pay is positively related to the quality of water service. Ferro and Lentini (2013) find that financial sustainability is strongly correlated with access to improved water rates. Nauges and Whittington (2017) and Whittington et al. (2015) show that increasing block tariffs perform poorly in targeting subsidies to the poor. These tariff schemes also introduce price distortions that create economic efficiency losses, though welfare losses are relatively low. Barde and Lehman (2014) show that means-tested tariffs distribute more income to the poor than increasing block tariffs but that the share of poor consumers benefiting from water subsidies is lower than it is with meanstested tariffs. Molinos and Donoso (2016) propose a water rate that incentivizes water use sustainability and equity among consumers.
Tariffs
Concluding Remarks
Several important findings emerge from this study:
 Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the 1990s, access to improved water is now almost universal in LAC (95 percent). Efforts are still needed in the sanitation sector and in rural areas in both sectors.
 Increasing block tariffs, which part of the literature has strongly criticized and is the main type of tariff used in the region, do not penalize high consumption levels sufficiently. The average bill for 15 cubic meters of water (the minimum needed to cover basic needs) is lower in LAC than in the Middle East and North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa.
 Service quality remains weak. The continuity of service has declined in recent years, and in urban areas (for which data are available) almost 40 percent of supplied water is wasted (the situation is worse in rural areas, although data are not available). Poor service quality affects the economy, and both human health and the environment.
 The financial health and sustainability of water utilities is weak. Access to capital markets is difficult for most utilities in the region.
 Most countries have independent regulatory agencies in the sector. The literature suggests that they improve the provision of water and sanitation services but do not necessarily increase private sector participation, which remains a challenge. 
